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Abstract
As Harvey Brown emphasizes in his book Physical Relativity, inertial motion in general
relativity is best understood as a theorem, and not a postulate. Here I discuss the status
of the “conservation condition”, which states that the energy-momentum tensor associated
with non-interacting matter is covariantly divergence-free, in connection with such theorems.
I argue that the conservation condition is best understood as a consequence of the differential
equations governing the evolution of matter in general relativity and many other theories.
I conclude by discussing what it means to posit a certain spacetime geometry and the
relationship between that geometry and the dynamical properties of matter.
Keywords: Harvey Brown, Physical Relativity, general relativity, Newton-Cartan theory,
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1. Introduction
In Physical Relativity (Brown, 2005), Harvey Brown defends a number of startling and
provocative claims regarding the status of inertial motion in general relativity and other
theories.1 He writes, for instance, that,
Inertia, before Einstein’s general theory of relativity, was a miracle. I do not
mean the existence of inertial mass, but the postulate that force-free (henceforth
free) bodies conspire to move in straight lines at uniform speeds while being
unable, by fiat, to communicate with each other. It is probably fair to say that
anyone who is not amazed by this conspiracy has not understood it. (And the
coin has two sides: anyone who is not struck by the manner in which the general
theory is able to explain the conspiracy ... has failed to appreciate its strength....)
(pp. 14-5)
Email address: weatherj@uci.edu (James Owen Weatherall)
1See also Brown and Pooley (2006).
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Later, he clarifies the sense in which general relativity (GR) is distinctive. He writes, “GR is
the first in the long line of dynamical theories, based on that profound Aristotelian distinction
between natural and forced motions of bodies, that explains inertial motion” (p. 141). GR
achieves this explanatory virtue by dint of the fact that whereas in “...Newtonian mechanics
and SR [special relativity], the conspiracy of inertia is a postulate...,” in GR, “...the geodesic
principle [i.e., the principle governing inertial motion] is no longer a postulate but a theorem”
(p. 141).
It is true that there are theorems in general relativity that capture the geodesic principle.
(In what follows, I will focus on one such result, due to Geroch and Jang (1975).)2 Even
so, Brown’s arguments concerning the special status of inertial motion in GR have been
controversial. For instance, Brown places special weight on the fact that it is a consequence
of Einstein’s equation that energy-momentum must be (locally) conserved, in the sense that
the covariant divergence of the total energy-momentum of (source) matter must vanish. This
conservation condition plays an essential role in the theorems governing inertial motion in
general relativity. And so, Brown argues, inertial motion in GR follows from Einstein’s
equation. But as Malament (2012a) emphasizes, conservation of energy-momentum alone
is not sufficient to establish the geodesic principle. He shows that one also requires an
energy condition, effectively requiring that energy-momentum is positive in a suitable sense.
2 In addition to the Geroch-Jang theorem, there are also the results of Souriau (1974), Sternberg and
Guillemin (1984), Ehlers and Geroch (2004), Gralla and Wald (2011), Geroch and Weatherall (2017), and
others. The so-called “problem of motion” in general relativity has a long history, going back to Einstein and
Grommer (1927) and Einstein et al. (1938). Havas (1989), Kennefick (2005), and Lehmkuhl (2017a) discuss
aspects of this history, while Lehmkuhl (2017b) describes some of the key differences between Einstein’s
approach to the problem and modern approaches. For surveys of the now-vast literature on the subject,
see Damour (1989), Blanchet (2000), Poisson et al. (2011), Asada et al. (2011), and the contributions to
Puetzfeld et al. (2015); see also Tamir (2012), who discusses several approaches but argues against the
claim that any of these really establish geodesic motion for actual small bodies. Geroch and Weatherall
(2017) clarify the relationship between Ehlers-Geroch-Jang-style “curve first” results and results based on
distributions, such as are developed by Sternberg and Guillemin (1984), strengthening both classes of result.
Although in my view, a number of recent results improve on the Geroch-Jang theorem, the Geroch-Jang
theorem is nonetheless attractive for foundational discussions because it is simple, perspicuous, and by now
familiar to many philosophers of physics because it has been the focus of several papers discussing inertial
motion in connection with Brown’s work.
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Malament goes on to show that in the absence of any energy condition, conserved matter
may follow any timelike curve at all.3
Another line of argument puts pressure on the claim that GR is sharply distinguished
from other theories with regard to inertial motion, with a special focus on Newtonian gravita-
tion. In particular, one can prove a theorem in the context of the geometrized reformulation
of Newtonian gravitation (GNG), sometimes known as Newton-Cartan theory, that is strik-
ingly similar to the Geroch-Jang theorem (Weatherall, 2011a).4 I have argued elsewhere
that, in light of this theorem, the status of inertial motion in Newtonian gravitation is strik-
ingly similar to the situation in GR (Weatherall, 2011c, 2017b). In both theories, if one
assumes an energy condition (of, arguably, similar strength in each case) and a conserva-
tion condition (of the same form), the geodesic principle becomes a theorem. I have also
argued that there is thus a sense in which both theories may be said to explain inertial
motion, equally well—though the conditions required in the theorems mean that the sense
of explanation involved is subtle (Weatherall, 2017b).5
Although the role of energy conditions in these theorems is interesting and important, I
3Regarding just what energy condition is needed to prove the Geroch-Jang theorem, see Weatherall
(2012); Bezares et al. (2015) generalize the Ehlers-Geroch strengthening of the Geroch-Jang theorem, using
a weaker averaged energy condition. For more on energy conditions in general, included extensive discussion
of their status and interpretation, see Curiel (2017).
4 Note that although the theorem is set in GNG, it also covers ordinary Newtonian gravitation, which
corresponds in this context to the special case where spacetime happens to be flat. (In the same sense, the
Geroch-Jang theorem may be understood to cover special relativity, a point I will return to below.) GNG
is of interest for several reasons. One reason is that it casts Newtonian gravitation in a language maximally
similar to GR, facilitating comparative analyses. Another reason is that there is a natural sense in which
it is the “classical limit” of GR, as discussed by Ehlers (1981, 1997), Ku¨nzle (1976), Malament (1986a,b),
Weatherall (2011b), and Fletcher (2014). For more on GNG and its relationship to Newtonian gravitation,
see Trautman (1965), Glymour (1980), Friedman (1983), Bain (2004), Malament (2012b), Knox (2011), and
Weatherall (2016a). The status of inertial motion in Newtonian gravitation is also discussed in detail by
Earman and Friedman (1973), who anticipate the claim that it may be understood as a theorem.
5This sense of explanation is related to what I have previously called the “puzzleball view” of theories.
Samaroo (2015) has recently argued against taking either of these theorems to provide explanations; in
both cases, he takes them to provide explications of inertial motion. I do not want to quibble over these
words, and I tend to agree with the thrust of his arguments. Sus (2014), meanwhile, has maintained that
despite the result discussed above, it is nonetheless the case that the explanation one gets in GR is “more
dynamical”. I will return to these arguments in section 6.
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will set that issue aside in what follows. Instead, my focus will be on what Brown himself
suggests is the heart of the matter: the status of the conservation condition stating that
the energy-momentum (or, in GNG, mass-momentum) of a free body is divergence-free. As
Brown emphasizes, in GR this conservation condition must hold for the total source matter
appearing in Einstein’s equation. Nothing analogous can be claimed in GNG, where the
geometrized Poisson equation—the analog to Einstein’s equation—does not imply anything
about the divergence of the mass-momentum tensor. And so, in GNG the conservation
condition must be assumed independently. I have previously argued both that Brown’s
claim about Einstein’s equation, though true, is tangential to the point at hand, and also
that the conservation condition should be understood as a meta-principle, expected to hold
in a wide range of spacetime theories.
I still endorse both of these arguments. But I think there is more to say. In what fol-
lows, I will echo and amplify an observation due to Pooley (2013, pp. 543), to the effect
that the conservation condition is doubly secured in GR: it follows both from Einstein’s
equation and also from the differential equations governing matter.6 That is, it is a general
property of the class of differential equations that describe matter in GR that, associated
with any solution to those equations, there is always a quantity with the relevant properties
of an energy-momentum tensor that is divergence-free whenever the matter in question is
non-interacting. This fact follows from the role that the spacetime metric and derivative
operator play in those equations. More importantly, it holds much more generally than
just in GR, including in theories where the analogue of Einstein’s equation does not imply
that the energy-momentum tensor is divergence-free (including GNG), or where there is no
analogue to Einstein’s equation because spacetime structure is fixed (as in SR or Newto-
nian gravitation). This situation, I will argue, indicates a deep link between conservation
6Pooley cites a classic paper by Trautman (1962) to support this claim; Trautman’s justification is
ultimately very close to the view defended here.
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and inertia, on the one hand, and the ambient geometry in which a system of differential
equations is set.7
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. I will begin by stating and briefly
discussing the Geroch-Jang theorem. As I will argue, the important question is not, “is
energy-momentum divergence-free?” but rather, “with respect to what derivative opera-
tor is energy-momentum divergence-free?” Next I will discuss the status of the conservation
condition in GR, showing the sense in which it follows from the class of differential equations
governing matter. The technical arguments here are well known, and in fact Brown discusses
them briefly in an appendix to Physical Relativity. But there is some value to rehearsing
them, and to drawing the connection between what does the work in these arguments and
what is necessary for the Geroch-Jang theorem. Next I will turn to some alternative rela-
tivistic theories in which the analogue to Einstein’s equation does not secure conservation,
including Unimodular gravity, Tensor-Vector-Scalar gravity (TeVeS), and SR, showing how
conservation—and hence, inertial motion—nonetheless arises in each of these cases. I will
next turn to Newtonian gravitation, presenting the analogue of the Geroch-Jang theorem
in that context and showing that there, too, one can expect that there will always be a
conserved quantity associated with matter. I will conclude by drawing morals concerning
the relationship between the dynamics of matter and spacetime geometry.
2. The Geroch-Jang Theorem
In what follows, a relativistic spacetime is a pair (M, gab), where M is a smooth, four-
dimensional, connected manifold, assumed to be Hausdorff and second countable, and gab is
a smooth, Lorentzian metric on M .8 Associated with any relativistic spacetime is a unique
7One can take these arguments to generally expand on my earlier claim that conservation is a “meta-
principle”. The idea here is to show why we should expect it to hold so generally.
8 I work in the signature (1,−1,−1,−1). In what follows, I will generally assume that all of the objects—
manifolds, tensor fields, etc.—that are candidates to be smooth are smooth. I will also limit attention to
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torsion-free derivative operator ∇ satisfying the condition ∇agbc = 0, known as the Levi-
Civita derivative operator. Any derivative operator determines a class of privileged curves,
known as geodesics. A geodesic of a derivative operator is a curve γ whose tangent field
ξa satisfies ξn∇nξa = 0; such curves are naturally understood as non-accelerating, by the
standard of acceleration set by ∇. In what follows, we will say that a (tangent) vector ξa at
a point is timelike if gabξ
aξb > 0.
The theorem may then be stated as follows.9 (Here and in the rest of the next two
sections, all indices are raised and lowered using gab.)
Theorem 1. (Geroch and Jang (1975)) Let (M, gab) be a relativistic spacetime. Let
γ : I → M be a smooth, imbedded curve. Suppose that given any open subset O of M
containing γ[I], there exists a smooth, symmetric field T ab with the following properties.
1. T ab satisfies the strengthened dominant energy condition, i.e. given any timelike vector
ξa at any point in M , T abξaξb ≥ 0 and either T ab = 0 or T abξb is timelike;
2. T ab satisfies the conservation condition, i.e. ∇bT ab = 0;
3. supp(T ab) ⊂ O; and
4. there is at least one point in O at which T ab 6= 0.
Then γ is a timelike curve that may be reparametrized as a geodesic.
Several remarks are in order concerning the interpretation of this theorem. First, in GR
and in all of the other physical theories discussed in this paper, the points of M represent
events in space and time. Matter is represented by fields on M , i.e., smooth assignments
of mathematical objects to points of M . There are different kinds of matter that one
might encounter—perfect fluids, electromagnetic fields, Klein-Gordon fields, and so on—but
matter of any kind is associated with a smooth, symmetric, rank-2 tensor, T ab, representing
that matter’s energy and momentum densities as determined by arbitrary observers.10 This
tangent structures, so that vectors, vector fields, and so forth should all be understood as tangent to the
manifold. For background on either general relativity or Lorentzian geometry, the reader is encouraged to
consult Hawking and Ellis (1973), Wald (1984), O’Neill (1983), and Malament (2012b).
9This statement of the theorem follows Malament (2012b, Prop. 2.5.2) closely. See fn. 2 for references
to other results and discussions.
10For discussions of how T ab encodes this information, see Hawking and Ellis (1973, §3.2), Sachs and Wu
(1973, §3.1), and Malament (2012b, §2.5).
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tensor is generally presumed to vanish in an open region if and only if there is no matter
present in that region, reflecting the assumptions that (1) all matter is associated with
some quantity of energy and momentum, and (2) all energy and momentum is associated
with matter.11 Thus, the T ab fields appearing in the Geroch-Jang theorem may be taken
to characterize configurations of matter (of a generic, non-specified sort) that is localized to
regions near a curve γ.
This matter is presumed to satisfy two conditions. The strengthened dominant energy
condition captures a sense in which the mass-energy associated with the matter is always
positive and also that the 4-momentum density determined by any observer is a timelike
vector, which may be understood as a causality condition satisfied by massive matter.12
And the conservation condition captures a sense in which the matter in question is free,
i.e., not interacting with any other matter. (Of course, much more will be said about the
conservation condition and its interpretation in what follows.) Both of these conditions are
supposed to hold of generic, physically reasonable, massive matter that is not interacting
with its environment.
Thus, the theorem may be interpreted as follows. If a curve γ is such that for any
neighborhood of that curve, there exists some configuration of generic, physically reasonable,
free, massive matter, which is present (only) in that neighborhood, then the curve must
be a timelike geodesic. In other words, the only curves along which free, arbitrarily small
“bodies,” i.e., spatially compact matter configurations, may propagate are timelike geodesics.
11Cf. Hawking and Ellis (1973, p. 61). Of course, there is a controversial issue related to whether vacuum
phenomena, such as gravitational waves, should be associated with energy in some extended sense. I set that
aside here. At very least, all energy and momentum of the sort that may be encoded in an energy-momentum
tensor is associated with matter.
12 Note that pure radiation will generally not satisfy the strengthened dominant energy condition. As
noted in the introduction, some energy condition or other is needed in order to get geodesic motion, and for
the theorem as stated, where the fact that γ is timelike is a consequence of the theorem, various well-known
weaker conditions will not suffice (Malament, 2012a; Weatherall, 2012). On the other hand, if one begins by
supposing that γ is a timelike curve, it seems there is much more flexibility concerning the energy condition
(Geroch and Weatherall, 2017).
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Under this interpretation, the theorem may be seen to capture the geodesic principle, which
states that in the absence of external forces, massive test point particles follow timelike
geodesics.13 Here we understand a “massive particle” as the small-body limit of generic,
physically reasonable massive matter, in the sense described above. Note that the geodesic
principle, as stated here, concerns test matter (as opposed to [gravitational] source matter),
in the sense that we do not suppose that the metric gab depends on the presence of the
particle. This is reflected in the Geroch-Jang theorem by the fact that it presumes a fixed
background spacetime (M, gab), and one does not place any constraints on the relationship
between that spacetime and any of the T ab fields under consideration.14
This last point has an important consequence. As will be discussed in the next section,
any relativistic spacetime may be understood as a possible universe allowed by GR, where
Einstein’s equation asserts that the total energy-momentum tensor T ab arising from all
matter in the universe is proportional to the Einstein tensor, Gab, defined by:
Gab = Rab − 1
2
Rgab, (1)
where Rab = R
n
abn is the Ricci curvature associated with ∇ and R = Raa is the curvature
scalar. But as I just noted, neither Einstein’s equation nor the Einstein tensor play any role
in the Geroch-Jang theorem. And so the theorem does not require one to understand the
spacetime (M, gab) within the context of any particular physical theory. Instead, it captures
a general fact about curves on Lorentzian manifolds. This means that it is readily applied
13Note that there is a small gap, here. The Geroch-Jang theorem says that the only curves along which
arbitrarily small, free, massive bodies may propagate are timelike geodesics; it does not say that there are
any bodies that do so propagate, in the sense that it does not establish that any curves satisfy the antecedent
of the theorem. In fact, however, one can construct perfect fluids satisfying the conditions of the theorem
in arbitrarily small neighborhoods of timelike geodesics in arbitrary spacetimes.
14Ehlers and Geroch (2004) strengthen the Geroch-Jang theorem to show that even if one considers
extended bodies that do contribute to gab via Einstein’s equation, then in the small-body limit these bodies
follow timelike geodesics as long as their contribution to a background spacetime metric becomes arbitrarily
small.
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to any physical theory that takes spacetime to be represented by a Lorentzian manifold,
irrespective of any relationship that might obtain between the metric on that manifold
and the energy-momentum density of matter, so long as matter in that theory satisfies the
conservation and energy conditions. Indeed, insofar as these conditions really do reflect
generic facts about matter, the Geroch-Jang theorem reveals not only that the geodesic
principle is considerably more general than GR itself, but that the status of the geodesic
principle as a theorem, not a postulate, is similarly general.
Regarding this generality, there is another feature of the Geroch-Jang theorem that is
worth emphasizing. The theorem establishes a relationship between two classes of objects:
a class of curves—timelike geodesics—on the one hand; and a class of smooth, symmetric
tensor fields—namely those that are divergence-free and satisfy a certain energy condition—
on the other. Both of these classes of object are defined relative to a particular derivative
operator, ∇. It is this structure that ultimately links the two classes: it is the tensor fields
that are divergence-free relative to ∇ that, in the small-body limit, must follow the geodesics
of ∇. Indeed, this is the only structure relating the two classes of objects, in the sense that if
one required in the statement of the Geroch-Jang theorem that each field T ab were conserved
relative to some other (metric) derivative operator, it would follow that in the small-body
limit, matter would follow the geodesics of that derivative operator instead.15 And so, the
key to matter obeying the geodesic principle is that T ab be divergence-free relative to the
Levi-Civita derivative operator associated with the spacetime metric.
Finally, note that nothing in the theorem requires us to suppose that T ab represents
energy-momentum, in the sense of encoding anything about particular measurements that
15I offer this claim without proof, though it essentially follows from the original proof of the Geroch-
Jang theorem once one is attentive to subtleties concerning the energy condition, which makes reference to
the metric, and not the derivative operator. (Recall, however, footnote 12: the work done by the energy
condition is to define a certain cone; this could be done without reference to any metric.) This particular
relationship emerges more transparently if one uses the methods of Geroch and Weatherall (2017). One
could also imagine generalizing further, to the case where ∇ is not the Levi-Civita derivative operator of
any metric.
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an observer might make. What is essential to the theorem (and its interpretation) is just
that there be some property or other represented by a symmetric, rank-2 tensor field that
is supported precisely where matter is present, and which is divergence-free relative to a
specified derivative operator whenever that matter is non-interacting. Thus, we see that the
important point in the Geroch-Jang theorem is not just that matter is “conserved” in some
sense or other: it is that matter is associated with some property that is suitably adapted
to the background spacetime structure in the sense of being divergence-free relative to a
particular derivative operator. That the energy-momentum tensor associated with matter
happens to reliably have these features merely makes the significance of the result more
transparent.
3. Conservation in General Relativity
I will now specialize to GR.16 Here one considers relativistic spacetimes (M, gab) with matter
fields having energy-momentum density T ab, as sketched above. Now, though, one requires
that the spacetime metric and its derivatives are dynamically related to the distribution of
energy and momentum throughout space and time according to Einstein’s equation
Gab = 8piTab, (2)
where Gab is the Einstein tensor defined in Eq. (1) and T
ab is the total energy-momentum
density in the universe, i.e., the sum of the energy-momentum tensors associated with all
matter fields.17
As noted in the introduction, and as Brown emphasizes, Einstein’s equation has an
immediate consequence concerning conservation (Brown, 2005, p. 161). The left-hand side
of Einstein’s equation, the Einstein tensor Gab, is a function of a metric gab and its associated
16For background, see the references in note 8.
17Here and throughout I work in units where c = G = 1.
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Ricci curvature tensor and curvature scalar. And it happens to follow from a mathematical
fact, known as Bianchi’s identity, that the divergence of this tensor, taken with respect
to the Levi-Civita derivative operator determined by gab, vanishes identically. This fact
holds generally, of any Riemannian or semi-Riemannian manifold at all, and is not a special
consequence of GR. But if the left-hand side of Einstein’s equation is necessarily divergence-
free, then so too must be the right-hand side, i.e., the total energy-momentum density. In
this sense, that energy-momentum density is conserved follows from Einstein’s equation.
One has to be careful about this inference, however—particularly in the context of the
Geroch-Jang theorem. For one, as noted in the introduction, this inference concerns only
matter that appears as a source in Einstein’s equation. Of course, insofar as one accepts
GR, one should expect that all matter present in the actual universe contributes to the total
energy-momentum tensor on the right-hand side of Einstein’s equation. But the geodesic
principle is an idealization concerning matter that is not only physically small, in the sense
of occupying vanishing spatial volume, but also of vanishing mass, such that its contribution
to Einstein’s equation can be neglected.18 As noted in the previous section, this is reflected
in the Geroch-Jang theorem by the fact that one works with a curve γ in a fixed background
spacetime, and one does not assume that the T ab fields associated with neighborhoods of
γ satisfy Einstein’s equation for that fixed background spacetime. Indeed, doing so would
substantially limit the significance of the theorem, insofar as generic spacetimes are not
solutions to Einstein’s equation for matter with spatially compact support.
There is another concern about the inference. Even if one focuses attention on source
matter, Einstein’s equation tells us only about the divergence of the total energy-momentum
content of the universe. But the geodesic principle is supposed to apply more generally:
18This point is emphasized in particular by Tamir (2012), though I do not think it is controversial.
Extended, massive matter will at best approximate geodesic motion. Note that even the Ehlers-Geroch
theorem ultimately concerns the motion of bodies only in the limit where their contribution to Einstein’s
equation becomes arbitrarily small; see also Gralla and Wald (2011), who derive leading order corrections
to this limit.
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it does not concern only matter that is propagating in regions were no other matter is
present (i.e., where the energy-momentum associated with the small body is the total energy-
momentum present); it is supposed to apply to all free matter, i.e., any matter that happens
not to be interacting with its environment, even when there is other matter present in that
environment. (Think, for instance, of neutrinos or dark matter passing through the earth.
One should expect these to approximately follow timelike geodesics, even though there is
other matter present, because that matter is transparent to them.) But we cannot infer from
Einstein’s equation that the energy-momentum associated with such matter is divergence-
free. This observation indicates that in the background of the interpretation of the Geroch-
Jang theorem and similar results is a more general framework for thinking about influence
and interaction between different matter fields in a region of spacetime, where interaction
is signalled by exchange of energy-momentum. This exchange is represented by a failure of
the energy-momentum tensors associated with two or more matter fields to be individually
divergence-free, even though their sum is divergence-free. This framework for thinking about
interaction (and, conversely, non-interaction) is more general than GR.
All that said, Einstein’s equation does establish one relationship: it tells us with respect
to what derivative operator the total energy-momentum tensor is conserved. And in the
special case where a small body is the only matter present in a region, and we suppose that
it is taken as source matter, then Einstein’s equation does imply that there is a property
of that body represented by a symmetric rank-2 tensor and conserved relative to the Levi-
Civita derivative operator. Perhaps this does not directly imply that all non-interacting
matter is conserved relative to this derivative operator, but it is a strong link between the
dynamical properties of matter and the geometry of spacetime.
Still, one might wonder if this is the only such link, or even the strongest one. In fact,
as I will argue presently, it is not the only link. To see this, one must first address a
prior question: given some variety of matter, how are we supposed to associate an energy-
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momentum tensor with it in the first place? In other words, suppose you postulate some
form of matter—some new object represented by a field, ΨX , say, where the X indicates
arbitrary index structure, satisfying some system of differential equations on spacetime.19
Presumably there will be some energy-momentum tensor associated with this matter. One
might expect, based on experience with other matter fields, that this energy-momentum
tensor will be some algebraic function of ΨX , and that it will have certain properties, such
as that it will be non-vanishing in any open region were the field ΨX is non-vanishing. But
how are you to actually determine what T ab is?
In general, there is no strict procedure, even if you know the dynamics of the matter
field. Hawking and Ellis (1973) put the point nicely, as follows:
The conditions (i) and (ii) of postulate (b) [that (i) total energy-momentum is
non-vanishing on an open set iff the matter field vanishes there, and (ii) that total
energy-momentum is divergence-free] do not tell one how to construct the energy-
momentum tensor for a given set of fields, or whether it is unique. In practice
one relies heavily on one’s intuitive knowledge of what energy and momentum
are. (p. 64)
Insofar as the procedure relies on intuition and rules of thumb, the fact that the energy-
momentum tensors we associate with matter—whether newly postulated matter, or even
familiar matter fields such as electromagnetic fields—happen to be divergence-free when
non-interacting may look arbitrary, unmotivated, or conventional. From this perspective, the
insight offered by Einstein’s equation, that whatever else is the case total energy-momentum
must be conserved for Einstein’s equation to make sense, looks particularly valuable.
But, Hawking and Ellis continue, there is an important and broad exception to the
general rule just stated. In the special case where the differential equations governing ΨX
may be derived by extremizing an action associated with a Lagrangian density, there is a
19We assume here that these indices are tangent indices. One could extend this argument to matter
represented by sections of a more general vector bundle, but doing so introduces further complications.
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“definite and unique formula for the energy-momentum tensor” associated with that matter
(p. 64). This formula for the tensor is forced upon us as the term that appears on the right-
hand side of Einstein’s equation, now understood as the Euler-Lagrange equation associated
with extremizing the joint Einstein-Hilbert-matter action with respect to the spacetime
metric. (The Einstein-Hilbert action is the action of GR.) Once we have this formula,
however, we are in a position to investigate the properties associated with this energy-
momentum tensor. And as we will see, one can show that any energy-momentum tensor
that arises in this way, in the absence of interactions with other matter—understood, now,
as “interaction terms” in a joint Lagrangian density—must be divergence-free with respect
to the covariant derivative operator.
The argument proceeds as follows.20 Let us begin by supposing that we have, associated
with the field ΨX , a Lagrangian density, which we understand as a scalar field L[ΨX , gab] on
spacetime whose value at each point is given by some fixed algebraic function, independent
of the point, of the metric gab at that point, Ψ
X at that point, and the covariant derivatives
of ΨX at that point, up to some finite order. This Lagrangian density may be integrated
over compact regions C of spacetime to define an action,
IC [Ψ
X , gab] =
∫
C
L(ΨX , gab)dV, (3)
where dV is a volume element determined by gab. This action is a functional on field
configurations (and their derivatives), i.e., a map from field configuration on M to real
20The treatment here most closely follows that of Hawking and Ellis (1973, pp. 64–67), with some elements
borrowed from Wald (1984, Appendix E.1). See also Trautman (1962) and Brown (2005, Appendix A);
Holman (2010) explains the relationship between this argument and Noether’s theorems. Of course, for
many purposes it is more natural to think of a Lagrangian density as a scalar field on some appropriate jet
bundle over spacetime, as in, for instance, Bleecker (1981) or Saunders (1989). But the extra generality of
that approach is not necessary here, and so I prefer to work in a setting familiar from standard texts. Note,
too, that when I use the term “density”, I mean only “quantity I expect to integrate”, though there would
be no contentful change if one interpreted the term instead in the sense of “quantity that may be integrated
even in the absence of orientability”. Still, for simplicity, I will suppose that the manifold on which we are
working is orientable.
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numbers. From this action, we derive equations of motion for ΨX by requiring that this
action functional be functionally differentiable and stationary under variations of the field
ΨX that vanish outside of the interior of C, for all compact regions C.
More precisely, by a variation of the field ΨX about some value ΨX0 , I mean a one
parameter family s 7→ ΨX(s), for s defined on some open interval (−, ) ⊆ R, with the
properties that: (1) ΨX(0) = ΨX0 at each point p; (2) for all s ∈ (−, ), ΨX(s) = ΨX0
outside of the interior of C; and (3) the family is differentiable with respect to s at s = 0.
Given such a variation, the derivative
(
dΨX/ds
)
|s=0 is denoted by δΨ
X
|ΨX0
. We will say that
a functional S[ΨX ] is functionally differentiable at ΨX0 if there exists a tensor field, denoted(
δS
δΨX
)
|ΨX0
, such that for all variations,
(
dS
ds
)
|s=0
=
∫
M
(
δS
δΨX
)
|ΨX0
δΨX|ΨX0 .
A functional is functionally differentiable if it is functionally differentiable at all field values
ΨX0 , in which case we define
δS
δΨX
as the functional derivative of S, where δS
δΨX
is a map from
field configurations to tensor fields whose evaluation at each field configuration ΨX0 yields(
δS
δΨX
)
|ΨX0
. Note that the actions associated with known matter fields are all functionally
differentiable.
An action IC [Ψ
X , gab] is said to be stationary under variations of the field configuration
ΨX at a particular configuration ΨX0 if
(
δIC
δΨX
)
|ΨX0
= 0. This is known to occur at ΨX0 if and
only if ΨX0 is a solution to the Euler-Lagrange equations, which are differential equations
on M with ΨX as the independent variable. It is these Euler-Lagrange equations that are
taken to be the field equations governing ΨX , and they are understood to be derived from the
action in the sense that their solutions are values of ΨX for which the action is stationary.
Note that since the Lagrangian density for ΨX will in general depend on the metric gab,
so too will the Euler-Lagrange equations. Thus, a solution to the equations will only be
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a solution for some given metric field, g0ab. To emphasize this important fact, I will write(
δIC
δΨX
)
|ΨX0 ,g0ab
in what follows to indicate that any variation in ΨX depends on the metric.
Of course, my purpose here is not to systematically develop Lagrangian field theory.
Rather, it is just to lay sufficient groundwork to make the following observation. The func-
tional IC is defined as an integral of some scalar field L, which in turn is a function of tensor
fields on M . This means that if χ : M →M is a diffeomorphism that acts as the identity out-
side of C, it must be the case that IC [Ψ
X , gab] =
∫
C
L(ΨX , gab)dV =
∫
C
χ∗(L(ΨX , gab)dV ) =∫
C
L(χ∗(ΨX), χ∗(gab))χ∗(dV )) = IC [χ∗(ΨX), χ∗(gab)], where the second equality follows from
the general property that integrals are invariant under the pushforward map, and the third
equality follow from the fact that L is a functional of fields and their derivatives at a point,
independent of the point.21
But now suppose that one has some smooth vector field wa, vanishing outside of C, and
let s 7→ χs be the one-parameter family of diffeomorphisms generated by wa, for s in some
interval (−, ). Then s 7→ χ∗s(ΨX0 ) defines a variation of the field ΨX about the configuration
ΨX0 and s 7→ χ∗s(g0ab) defines a variation of gab about the configuration g0ab. It follows from
the invariance property of I just derived that:
0 =
(
dIC
ds
)
|s=0
. (4)
The functional integrability of IC then allows us to infer that,
0 =
∫
C
(
δIC
δgab
)
|ΨX0 ,g0ab
(δgab)|g0ab +
∫
C
(
δIC
δΨX
)
ΨX0 ,g
0
ab
(
δΨX
)
|ΨX0
, (5)
21This fact about actions is sometimes described as a “principle of general covariance”. But this “principle”
is just shorthand for the assertion that IC [Ψ
X , gab] = IC [χ∗(ΨX), χ∗(gab)] for any diffeomorphism of the
form discussed above; it is not some additional principal above and beyond the facts that the fields under
consideration are tensor fields and the Lagrangian density has a fixed functional form. In particular, it is not
“imposed” at this stage of the argument. Of course, the fact that the dynamics of matter are independent
of position is a substantive physical fact, though it is not clear that it has anything to do with coordinate
independence or general covariance (whatever that might mean), since any position-dependent dynamics
could equally well be expressed in a coordinate-independent manner.
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where we get two terms because we are simultaneously varying both ΨX and gab.
Suppose, now, that ΨX0 is a solution to its equations of motion, i.e., it is a stationary
point for the action, evaluated at the metric g0ab. Then
(
δIC
δΨX
)
|ΨX0 ,g0ab
= 0. It follows that
0 =
∫
C
(
δIC
δgab
)
|ΨX0 ,g0ab
(δgab)|g0ab . (6)
But recall that (δgab])|g0ab was defined as (dgab/ds)|s=0, which in this case is (dχs(g
0
ab)/ds)|s=0 =
£wg
0
ab = 2∇0(awb), where ∇0 is the Levi-Civita derivative operator associated with g0ab, be-
cause the variations were determined by a one-parameter family of diffeomorphisms gener-
ated by the vector field wa. It follows that
0 =
∫
C
(
δIC
δgab
)
|ΨX0 ,g0ab
∇0(awb) =
∫
C
T ab∇0(awb)dV = −
∫
C
(∇0aT ab)wbdV, (7)
where we have defined a field T ab as the unique (symmetric) tensor field with the property
that T abdV =
(
δIC
δgab
)
|ΨX0 ,g0ab
,22 and in the final equality we have integrated by parts, neglecting
the term
∫
C
∇0a(T abwb)dV because wa was defined to vanish on the boundary of C, which
implies, by Stokes’ theorem,
∫
C
∇0a(T abwb)dV = 0. Now, Eq. (7) necessarily holds for
all compact regions C and all vector fields wa supported on C. This can only happen if
∇0aT ab = 0 everywhere.
Let us step back from the details of the calculations, now, and consider what has been
established. We have just seen, based on a simple invariance property of integrals under the
pushforward map that any field configuration ΨX0 that extremizes an action IC [Ψ
X , gab] for
some metric g0ab is associated with a symmetric rank-2 tensor field T
ab, defined by T abdV =(
δIC
δgab
)
|ΨX0 ,g0ab
, that is divergence-free with respect to the Levi-Civita derivative operator
compatible with g0ab. Moreover, this quantity will be non-vanishing wherever Ψ
X
0 is non-
22Here dV is the volume element determined by g0ab.
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vanishing, as long as L vanishes only where ΨX0 does and contains terms that have non-trivial
dependence on g0ab, as is the case for all Lagrangians encountered in GR. Indeed, it turns
out that this tensor field T ab is, up to a constant multiple, the energy-momentum tensor
associated with ΨX0 , in the sense described above, i.e., that this is the term that would
appear on the right-hand side of Einstein’s equation, derived by extremizing an appropriate
action. But for present purposes, this is not essential. All that matters is that there is some
tensor quantity associated the matter field ΨX0 that is symmetric, rank-2, vanishing on open
regions only if ΨX0 vanishes there, and divergence-free relative to the spacetime derivative
operator.
Thus we have found that the existence of a divergence-free tensor T ab field associated
with the matter field ΨX may be understood as a consequence of the equations of motion
of ΨX : when those equations hold, in the absence of interactions, there is a divergence-free
quantity associated with the field, where the divergence is taken with respect to the covariant
derivative operator. As promised, this argument provides a general, independent justification
for the conservation condition that does not run through Einstein’s equation—and for this
reason, as we will see in subsequent sections, may be applied to theories other than GR.
(As I discuss below, it also provides an independent justification for our association of the
conservation condition with non-interaction.) It follows that one can apply the Geroch-Jang
theorem to conclude that insofar as this kind of matter may be confined to propagate along
a curve, and if the matter satisfies an energy condition, then that curve must be a timelike
geodesic.23 In other words, the sort of matter represented by ΨX , in the small body limit,
must respect the inertial structure of GR.
23It is worth pointing out, however, that a lot of work here is done by the caveat “insofar as this kind of
matter may be confined to propagate along a curve”. In fact, the limiting conditions of the Geroch-Jang
theorem are strikingly strong, and solutions to many hyperbolic systems, including solutions to Maxwell’s
equations, the Klein-Gordon equation, and the Dirac equation, can never satisfy those limiting conditions
because wave equations generally do not have solutions that are supported only in arbitrary spatially compact
neighborhoods of a curve. (That is, they spread out over time.) This important issue is addressed by Geroch
and Weatherall (2017), however, and so the limitation may be mitigated.
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It is worth reflecting on what, in this derivation, makes the conservation condition true—
or, put differently in light of the discussion of the previous section, how is it that a particular
Levi-Civita derivative operator appears in this derivation? The answer has two parts, but
both depend on a basic assumption, which is that in the absence of interactions with other
matter, the Lagrangian density for a given matter field depends (only) on the matter field
itself, its covariant derivatives, and a metric with which the covariant derivative operator is
compatible.24 It is for this reason that a solution to the equations of motion for ΨX on a
spacetime (M, gab), is a solution only relative to the metric gab. This is the first part of the
answer: it is the covariant derivative operator ∇ determined by the metric relative to which
ΨX is a solution that appears in the conservation principle we end up with.
The second part of the answer is closely related: it is the same fact about the Lagrangian
density that allows us to draw the crucial inference that the action must be stationary
under certain joint variations of the fields, as a consequence of the fact that integrals are
invariant under pushforwards. This is what leads to the conclusion that ∇aT ab = 0. And
so, ultimately the reason that solutions to the equations of motion for a matter field must
be associated with a symmetric, rank-2, covariantly divergence-free tensor T ab is that the
spacetime metric plays a certain role in the equations of motion for ΨX . Or perhaps better:
one can find a quantity T ab that is divergence-free relative to ∇ because ∇ is the unique
torsion-free derivative operator determined by the metric that appears in the equations of
motion for ΨX .
I noted above that one reason to take the field T ab derived in this way as an energy-
momentum tensor is that if one were to extremize the joint Einstein-Hilbert-matter action
24It is not, as some authors would suggest, a “principle of general covariance” that does the important
work, here. (Recall footnote 21.) It is true that the argument requires that one is working with tensorial
quantities, so that a diffeomorphism may be extended to act on the dynamical fields. But there are many
derivative operators available on a manifold, and “general covariance” alone simply cannot pick out relative
to which of them the field T ab is to be divergence-free. This derivative operator—the link to the particular
inertial trajectories—is selected by other considerations in the argument.
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with respect to the metric, it would turn out that a field proportional to T ab would appear
in the resulting Euler-Lagrange equations in the place that the energy-momentum tensor
should. (Another reason to take it as an energy-momentum tensor is that the tensor derived
in this way has many properties we usually associate with energy and momentum.) So
one might worry that this means that the whole argument just presented really amounts to
nothing more than the original observation that whatever field appears opposite the Einstein
tensor must be divergence-free.
I think this worry is too fast. The main reason is that the argument just presented
goes through even without assuming that the metric appearing in T ab, or the dynamics of
ΨX , is a solution to Einstein’s equation for that particular source field. (In other words, the
Einstein-Hilbert action plays no role.) What matters is only that a metric play a certain role
in the dynamics of the matter field, and not that the metric additionally bear the relation to
that matter that is captured by Einstein’s equation. Indeed, as Wald (1984, p. 456) points
out, one can run the same argument above with just the Einstein-Hilbert action, instead
of a matter action, and conclude on its basis that the Einstein tensor must be conserved!
Thus, the (contracted) Bianchi identity may itself be viewed as a consequence of the role
that the metric plays in the Einstein-Hilbert action. From this perspective, the argument
that conservation follows from Einstein’s equation is itself just a special case of the more
general argument just presented.
This last point may raise another concern, however. The arguments of this section
have relied on variational methods, in such a way that one might get the impression that I
am claiming that variational methods are somehow more fundamental than other ways of
presenting the dynamics of fields, or that having a Lagrangian formulation is essential for
a theory to be physically interesting. But I do not mean to endorse this attitude towards
action principles at all.
As I see it, Lagrangian methods are just one useful and general way of analyzing the
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properties of systems of coupled differential equations. In this respect, they are not more
or less fundamental than other means of discussing the same equations, such as by using
methods from functional analysis or Hamiltonian methods. Variational methods have some
advantages, as I will discuss presently, but also some disadvantages, including that not all
systems of equations can be derived from a variational principle.
In the present case, using Lagrangian methods has two main advantages. One is that
it allows one to discuss the dynamical properties of many different (thought perhaps not
all possible) fields at once, to show how under very general circumstances one can find a
tensor T ab with the properties necessary to run the Geroch-Jang theorem, without invoking
Einstein’s equation. It also allows one to pinpoint, in a general setting, what features of the
dynamics of physical fields are important for establishing the existence of such a field T ab.
But this is ultimately a pragmatic virtue. And it is certainly the case that one could begin,
say, just with a system of equations for a field (such as the source-free Maxwell equations)
and produce, through intuition, brute force, or experience with the energy and momentum
properties of that field, a tensor T ab that one can then show is divergence-free by virtue
of the fields in question satisfying their equations of motion. As a way of establishing the
conservation condition, this approach is no less legitimate or “deep” than the one I pursue
here. But it is difficult to do in an abstract or sufficiently general way.
The second advantage to using variational methods in the present argument is that it
allows one to clearly say when a field is “free” or “non-interacting”. This occurs just when
the action for the field may be written as above, i.e., with no fields appearing except the
field whose dynamics one is studying and the metric. (If other fields appear in the action,
then one must run the argument for the full action for all such fields to derive the result, in
which case the field T ab that is conserved will include all of the interacting fields.) And so it
is that one can show that non-interacting fields will satisfy the conservation condition even
if there happen to be other fields present in the same region. It is this fact that we needed in
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order to get the interpretation we wanted from the Geroch-Jang theorem, that all free small
bodies (approximately) follow timelike geodesics. Again, though, one could also establish
this by assuming that there are no source terms in the differential equations governing the
fields in question, and so it is not as if an action principle is somehow essential to capture
the present notion of “non-interaction”.
4. Conservation in Other Relativistic Theories
In the last section, I began by specializing to GR, in order to discuss the relationship between
Einstein’s equation and conservation. But the derivation of the conservation condition that
I ultimately defended, like the Geroch-Jang theorem itself, did not depend on GR, in the
sense that neither Einstein’s equation nor the Einstein-Hilbert action played any role. What
mattered was only that there was some metric appearing in the matter Lagrangian density,
and that the Lagrangian density depended only on that metric, the fields themselves, and
their covariant derivatives. One important consequence of this independence from Einstein’s
equation is that the same argument may be run in other relativistic theories of gravitation in
which the analog of Einstein’s equation does not imply that there is a quantity T ab associated
with matter that is divergence-free. Thus, even in these alternative theories, one can invoke
the Geroch-Jang theorem, and the argument of the last section, to conclude that inertial
motion has the status of a theorem, not a postulate. I will now briefly illustrate this point
with some examples.
One simple such example is known as unimodular gravity, or sometimes trace-free Ein-
stein gravity (Anderson and Finkelstein, 1971; Unruh, 1989; Ellis et al., 2011). Unimodular
gravity is a variation on GR in which one moves from Einstein’s equation to a “trace-free”
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equation,25
Rab − 1
4
Rgab = 8pi
(
Tab − 1
4
Tgab
)
, (8)
where T = T aa is the trace of the energy-momentum tensor.
One motivation for moving to this equation is that terms of the form Λgab, which have
no trace-free part, do not appear, and so physical sources—i.e., contributions to the total
energy-momentum of the universe—that might mimic a cosmological constant, such as those
sometimes associated with quantum vacuum energies in semi-classical gravitation, do not
contribute to the right-hand side of the equation. Thus, it is argued, unimodular gravity
solves the so-called “cosmological constant problem”, at least on one understanding of what
that problem is supposed to be.26 The trace-free Einstein equation is of interest for present
purposes because it does not imply that T ab is divergence-free. However, one can show
that if we assume, in addition to Eq. (8), that ∇bT ab = 0, then one can recover Einstein’s
equation, up to a term Λ0gab, where Λ0 is an unspecified constant of integration. Thus, one
may understand unimodular gravity, in the presence of the conservation condition, to be
equivalent to GR modulo a cosmological constant term.
So how are we to understand the conservation condition in this theory? One might first
think that insofar as it is independent of Eq. (8), the conservation condition is now an
additional brute postulate, which, together with Eq. (8), implies Einstein’s equation. But
this is too fast. The reason is that the differential equations governing matter in unimodular
gravity are supposed to be precisely the same as in GR. In other words, the same Lagrangian
densities, with the same dependencies on the metric gab and the fields and their derivatives,
would describe the dynamics of matter in unimodular gravity. And as we have just seen,
25This equation is “trace-free” because it results by equating the trace-free parts of the Einstein tensor
and (a constant multiple of) the energy-momentum tensor. One can confirm that both Rab − 14Rgab and
Tab − 14Tgab have vanishing trace.
26For further discussion of unimodular gravity and the cosmological constant problem, see Finkelstein
et al. (2001), Earman (2003), Ellis et al. (2011), Ellis (2014), and Schneider (2017).
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it is a consequence of the dynamics governing these matter fields that they are associated
with a divergence-free quantity T ab. In other words, the modifications to Einstein’s equation
involved in moving from GR to unimodular gravity do not affect the conservation condition,
at least insofar as one understands the conservation condition to be underwritten by the
dynamics of matter. One can conclude, then, that the conservation condition is not an
independent postulate and that the relationship between unimodular gravity and GR is even
tighter than sometimes suggested. More importantly for present purposes, one can invoke
the Geroch-Jang theorem just as in GR and conclude that inertial motion in unimodular
gravity should be construed as a theorem, with assumptions of just the same strength.27
A second example is known as Tensor-Vector-Scalar gravity, or TeVeS for short. TeVeS
was introduced by Bekenstein (2004) as a relativistic generalization of so-called Modified
Newtonian dynamics, or MOND, a theory developed by Milgrom (1983) to account for as-
tronomical phenomena that would otherwise be explained by dark matter (without positing
dark matter). It is a theory in which one posits, in addition to the metric gab, two further
fields that govern “gravitational” interactions: a vector field ua, required to be of unit length
with respect to gab, and a scalar field, φ. The Lagrangian for these fields may be written as a
sum of the Einstein-Hilbert Lagrangian and two other terms, governing the dynamics of ua
and φ, respectively. The full details of the dynamics do not matter for present purposes; it
suffices to observe that the analogue to Einstein’s equation that one derives by varying the
total action with respect to the metric gab does not imply that the analogue to T
ab in those
equations is divergence-free with respect to ∇, the derivative operator compatible with gab.
Indeed, in general the energy-momentum tensor is not divergence-free with respect to ∇
in TeVeS. The reason is that in addition to the fields just described, one also defines a field
27In particular, note that since the matter dynamics in unimodular gravity are precisely those of GR, one
should expect the energy condition to be satisfied under just the same circumstances.
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known as the physical metric:
g˜ab = e2φgab − 2uaub sinh(2φ), (9)
with inverse g˜ab and associated Levi-Civita derivative operator ∇˜. One then posits that it
is this field that plays the role of the metric in the dynamics of matter. In other words,
given a matter field ΨX , one generically expects the (non-interacting) Lagrangian density
associated with ΨX to be a fixed algebraic function, depending only on g˜ab, Ψ
X , and the
covariant derivatives of ΨX with respect to ∇˜; likewise the matter action is defined by
integrating with respect to dV˜ , the volume element determined by g˜ab.
It follows that if one were to run the argument of the previous section, one would conclude
that it is T˜ ab, the unique field such that T˜ abdV˜ =
(
δIC
δg˜ab
)
|ΨX0 ,g0ab
, that is divergence-free when
the equations of motion for ΨX are satisfied, and more, that it is divergence-free with respect
to ∇˜, not ∇. Likewise, one should expect the Geroch-Jang theorem to apply—now with the
consequence that in the small-body limit, non-interacting matter should follow g˜ab−timelike
geodesics of ∇˜. Thus, in TeVeS as in GR, one can understand inertial motion to be a
theorem, not a postulate. And that theorem tells us that the geodesics probed by small
bodies are those of g˜ab, not gab. Insofar as conservation is taken to follow from the matter
dynamics, then, one can take TeVeS to explain inertial motion just as well as GR, where now
the explanation is that the matter dynamics are such that the effective metric appearing in
those dynamics is g˜ab. One might even argue that inertial motion is more strongly in need
of explanation in TeVeS than in GR, insofar as there are multiple fields in the theory that
may be taken to define candidate classes of privileged curves.
The line I have just adopted is, in many ways, compatible with Brown’s own remarks
about TeVeS (Brown, 2005, §9.5.2). As he observes,
The metric field that is surveyed by rods and clocks, whose conformal structure
25
is traced by light rays and whose geodesics correspond to the motion of free
bodies is clearly not [gab], but the less ‘basic’ [g˜ab]. ... It is this field, and not the
metric [gab] ..., which acquires chronometric significance, and it does so because
of the postulated dynamics in the theory. Right or wrong, the theory reminds us
that the operational significance of a non-singular second-rank tensor field, and
its geometric meaning, if any, depends on whether it is ‘delineated by matter
dynamics’. (p. 175)
On this much I have no objection: the metric g˜ab determines inertial structure in TeVeS
precisely because of the role it plays in the matter dynamics.
But the link between inertia and dynamics that runs through conservation is secured
only by the argument given in the previous section, and not by any argument involving the
TeVeS analogs to Einstein’s equation. Brown acknowledges as much when he writes, in a
footnote, that:
The vanishing of the covariant divergence of [T˜ ab]—with respect to [g˜ab]—is re-
quired if the geodesic principle of free motion and the local validity of Maxwell’s
equations are to hold, and this requirement is not a consequence of the field equa-
tions [for TeVeS] alone. It is a remarkable feature of the other field equations
that they conspire, together with the [TeVeS equations], to ensure the validity
of the ‘conservation’ requirement. (p. 175, fn. 66)
The first sentence is unobjectionable. But the second, I would suggest, is at best misleading,
because in the end the TeVeS equations themselves—the analog to Einstein’s equation in
particular—play no role at all in the fact that T˜ ab is divergence-free, just as, in the argu-
ment in the previous section, Einstein’s equation played no role. More, there is nothing
“remarkable” (or “conspiratorial”) about the fact that T˜ ab is divergence-free with respect
to ∇˜. It is a basic consequence of the fact that it is g˜ab that plays the requisite role in the
equations governing matter. In other words, if Brown wants to accept that TeVeS, by virtue
of all of the field equations taken together, ensures that T˜ ab is divergence-free, it seems he
needs to accept the cogency of the sort of argument given in the previous section. But if
that argument is cogent in TeVeS and unimodular gravity (assuming Brown accepts that it
is), it is hard to deny its cogency in GR.
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This discussion leads to a final remark, concerning the status of the conservation condi-
tion in SR. Brown emphasizes throughout Physical Relativity that GR is to be distinguished
from SR with respect to the status of inertial motion, precisely because it is a theorem in
GR and not SR. But both the Geroch-Jang theorem and the argument of the previous sec-
tion apply equally well in SR as in GR, insofar as it is the Minkowski metric that plays the
required role in the dynamics for matter. And so, it would seem, both inertial motion and
conservation of matter should be viewed as theorems of SR just as much as GR (or unimod-
ular gravity, or TeVeS), with much the same status in both cases. To resist this conclusion,
it would seem that the only line available to Brown would be to reject the arguments in the
previous section as somehow illegitimate, or insufficiently explanatory, to justify claiming
that SR explains inertial motion. I do not see the attraction of this line of argument, es-
pecially for Brown, who also argues that it is precisely the equations governing matter that
justify the operational significance of geometrical structures. But whatever else is the case,
if one were to adopt this line, it would seem to have the unpleasant consequence that TeVeS
and unimodular gravity, like SR, cannot be said to explain inertial motion—even though
Brown, at least, wants to take TeVeS as a paradigm example of the relationship between
effective geometry and matter dynamics.
5. Conservation in Newtonian Theories
I will now turn to Newtonian theories. The focus, here, will be on GNG, but just as what
was said about GR in section 3 turned out to apply equally well in SR, so, too, will what
I say about GNG apply to ordinary Newtonian gravitation. The setting now is a classical
spacetime, which is a quadruple (M, ta, h
ab,∇), where M is a smooth, four-dimensional
manifold that is once again Hausdorff and second countable; ta is a smooth one-form on
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M ;28 hab is a smooth symmetric field on M of signature (0, 1, 1, 1), satisfying habtb = 0;
and ∇ is a derivative operator on M that is compatible with ta and hab in the sense that
∇atb = 0 and ∇ahbc = 0.29
As in GR and other relativistic spacetime theories, points of the manifold M represent
events in space and time. The fields ta and h
ab may be understood as (degenerate) temporal
and spatial metrics, respectively, as follows. Given a vector ξa at a point, one says that
ξa is timelike if taξ
a 6= 0. Otherwise ξa is spacelike. If ξa is timelike, then it has temporal
length |taξa| and it is future-directed if taξa > 0. If ξa is spacelike, then there always exists
a (non-unique) covector σa such that ξ
a = habσb; we define the spatial length of ξ
a to be
√
habσaσb, where it can be shown that this number is independent of the choice of σa. It is
important to emphasize that the temporal and spatial metrics do not uniquely determine a
compatible derivative operator ∇: there are many derivative operators, including both flat
and curved ones, that are compatible with the metrics, and so the derivative operator is
a substantial additional piece of structure. Given this derivative operator, one may define
geodesics precisely as in a relativistic spacetime, and they again have an interpretation as
unaccelerated curves.
In this context, one can prove the following analogue to the Geroch-Jang theorem.
Theorem 2. (Weatherall, 2011a) Let (M, ta, h
ab,∇) be a classical spacetime satisfying
Rabcd = 0.
30 Let γ : I → M be a smooth imbedded curve. Suppose that given any open
subset O of M containing γ[I], there exists a smooth symmetric field T ab with the following
properties.
1. T ab satisfies the mass condition, i.e., whenever T ab 6= 0, T abtatb > 0;
2. T ab satisfies the conservation condition, i.e., ∇aT ab = 0;
3. supp(T ab) ⊂ O; and
28Note that by working with a rank-1 field ta instead of a rank-2 field tab, I am assuming that spacetime
is temporally orientable.
29For background and details on classical spacetimes, including GNG, see Trautman (1965) and (especially)
Malament (2012b, Ch. 4). See also the references in footnote .
30 Here and throughout this section we raise indices with hab, so that Rabcd = h
bnRancd. Note, however,
that hab is not invertible, and so one cannot unambiguously lower and index that has been raised in this
way.
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4. there is at least one point in O at which T ab 6= 0.
Then γ is a timelike curve that can be reparametrized as a geodesic.
The interpretation of this theorem is essentially the same as that of the Geroch-Jang
theorem. Once again, we take matter to be generically represented by fields on M , where
each of the various sorts of matter one encounters are associated with a smooth, symmetric
rank-2 tensor, T ab. Now this tensor encodes the mass and momentum densities as determined
by arbitrary observers.31 Once again this tensor vanishes in an open region if and only if
there is no matter present in that region. Thus, the T ab fields appearing in the theorem, as
in the Geroch-Jang theorem, characterize generic configurations of matter localized near a
curve γ.
Also as in the Geroch-Jang theorem, this matter must satisfy two conditions. The first
is a condition that captures a sense in which T ab is “positive”, now in the sense that mass
density is always positive and there are no fields whose mass vanishes anywhere that the field
is present. And we have a conservation condition to capture the idea that the matter is free.
As in the Geroch-Jang theorem, these conditions are supposed to hold of generic, physically
reasonable, massive matter that is not interacting with its environment. The only additional
constraint in the present theorem is that we require that Rabcd = 0. This curvature condition
is one of two conditions necessary for the recovery of ordinary Newtonian gravitation from a
model of GNG (the other is that Rab
c
d = R
c
d
a
b); one might understand both as criteria for
a spacetime to be “Newtonian”.32 Thus, the theorem may be interpreted just as in GR: in a
suitably Newtonian spacetime, the only curves along which free, arbitrarily small “bodies,”
i.e., spatially compact matter configurations, may propagate are timelike geodesics. And so
this theorem, too, captures the geodesic principle in GNG, in much the same way that the
Geroch-Jang theorem captures it in GR.
31For discussions of how T ab encodes this information, see especially Malament (2012b, §4.1); see also
Duval and Ku¨nzle (1978).
32See Trautman (1965) and Malament (2012b, §4.2) for discussions.
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Once again setting the energy (mass) condition aside, one may ask: what is the status
of the conservation condition in GNG? Note that there is no analogue to the first argument
we considered in the context of GR, concerning Einstein’s equation. This is because the
analogue to Einstein’s equation in GNG, the geometrized Poisson equation, states that
Rab = 4piρtatb (10)
where ρ = Tmntmtn is the mass density associated with the total matter in the universe as
determined by any (and hence, all) observer(s). The mass-momentum tensor T ab does not
appear in this equation in an uncontracted form, and so it is not clear how the equation
could have anything to say about the divergence of that tensor; moreover, all indices in the
equation are in lowered positions, and so to take a divergence one of them would need to
be raised, i.e., an inner product would need to be taken. The only object available to take
inner products, however, is hab, and the right-hand side of the equation is orthogonal to hab
in both indices. Hence raising indices with hab would annihilate both sides of the equation.
So it seems that the geometrized Poisson equation cannot imply that T ab is divergence-free.
But there is another route to establish that T ab must be divergence-free—or at least, that
there is some symmetric, rank-2 tensor field T ab, divergence-free with respect to the covariant
derivative operator defining the spacetime, associated with generic matter distributions in
the absence of interaction. The argument is due to Duval and Ku¨nzle (1978).33 As in GR,
it makes use of variational methods, though the differences in geometrical setting between
relativistic and classical spacetimes require some modifications.
Suppose we are again interested in a field ΨX , now in the context of a classical space-
time (M, ta, h
ab,∇). Let us suppose again, as in the relativistic case, that we have, asso-
ciated with the field ΨX , a Lagrangian density, which we now understand as a scalar field
33Duval and Ku¨nzle (1984) develop the argument in the context of a concrete example; see also Christian
(1997), who presents the argument in somewhat more, or at least different, detail.
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L(ΨX , ta, hab,∇) on spacetime. Once again this Lagrangian is required to be such that
its value at each point is given by some fixed algebraic function, independent of the point.
Now, however, the Lagrangian density is allowed to depend not only on ΨX and its covariant
derivatives (relative to ∇) at that point, but also on the spacetime structures ta, hab, and ∇,
all of which would generically be expected to appear in the dynamics of a field on classical
spacetime. Once again we may integrate the Lagrangian density over a compact region C
of spacetime to define an action,
IC [Ψ
X , ta, h
ab,∇] =
∫
C
L(ΨX , ta, hab,∇)dV, (11)
where now dV is the volume element determined by the classical metrics ta and h
ab.34 We
assume this action is functionally differentiable.
We would now like to run the same argument that we ran in the relativistic case. The
observation with which that argument began is unaffected by the new context, mutatis mu-
tandis : if χ : M → M is a diffeomorphism that acts as the identity outside of C, it must
be the case that IC [Ψ
X , ta, h
ab,∇] = ∫
C
L(ΨX , ta, hab,∇)dV =
∫
C
χ∗(L(ta, hab,∇)dV ) =∫
C
L(χ∗(ΨX), χ∗(ta), χ∗(hab), χ∗(∇)))χ∗(dV )) = IC [χ∗(ΨX), χ∗(ta), χ∗(hab), χ∗(∇)]. Once
again, the essential step is the second equality, which follows from the same general property
of integrals as in the relativistic case.
Following the same argument, then, suppose that we have a one parameter family s 7→ χs
of diffeomorphisms generated by some smooth vector field wa, vanishing outside of C, for
s in some interval (−, ). This one parameter family again defines variations of the fields
about any fixed values ΨX0 , t
0
ab, h
ab
0 , and ∇0. Suppose that ΨX0 happens to be a solution to
its equations of motion, for t0ab, h
ab
0 , and ∇0. We then find, invoking the invariance property
34For further details on this volume element, see Weatherall (2011a).
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just established, functional integrability, and the fact that δΨX|ΨX0
= 0 that:35
0 =
∫
C
QaδtadV +
∫
C
Pabδh
abdV +
∫
C
δIC
δ∇ δ∇, (12)
where we have defined Qa to be the unique tensor field such that QadV = δIC
δta
, and likewise
Pab is the unique field such that PabdV =
δIC
δhab
.
The variations of ta and h
ab under this one parameter family of diffeomorphisms are easy
to describe: they are, by definition, Lie derivatives with respect to wa, so that (δta)|t0a =
£wt
0
a = tn∇0awn and
(
δhab
)
|hab0
= £wh
ab
0 = −2∇0(awb). But variations of ∇ are somewhat
more difficult to describe. Following Duval and Ku¨nzle (1978), we characterize them as
follows. First, note that given any unit timelike vector field ua on M , there exists a unique
derivative operator
u
∇ on M that is compatible with t0a and hab0 , and which is such that
un
u
∇nua = 0 and
u
∇[aub] = 0.36 Meanwhile, given two derivative operators ∇ and ∇′ on
M , both compatible with t0a and h
ab
0 , there always exists a two-form κab, which is such that
∇′ = (∇, 2han0 t0(bκc)n). Thus, in particular, any derivative operator ∇ compatible with t0a
and hab0 is uniquely specified by a pair (u
a, κab), where u
a is a unit timelike vector ua and
κab is a 2-form. Finally, one can show that the 2-form appearing in this pair is closed if and
only if ∇ satisfies the “Newtonian” curvature condition, Rabcd = Rcdab; in what follows, we
will limit attention to derivative operators satisfying this condition. At least locally, then,
there always exists a one form Aa such that κab =
1
2
daAb, where da is the exterior derivative.
So (again, locally), we may uniquely specify a derivative operator by a pair (ua, Aa).
Specifying a derivative operator in this way has the useful feature that if ∇0 is specified
by the pair (ua, Aa), then for any diffeomorphism χ, χ
∗(∇0) is specified by (χ∗(ua), χ∗(Aa)).
More generally, any variation in ∇0 may be thought of as a suitable simultaneous variation
35Note that in Eq. (12) and in (most of) the remainder of the section, I have suppressed that all relevant
expressions are to be evaluated at s = 0, i.e., at ΨX0 , t
0
a, h
ab
0 , and ∇0, to avoid cumbersome notation.
36Here ∇[aub] = hn[a0
u
∇nub]. Recall fn. 30.
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of ua and Aa. This means that we may re-express the final term in Eq. (12) as,
∫
C
δIC
δ∇ δ∇ =
∫
C
Kaδu
adV +
∫
C
JaδAadV, (13)
where Ka is defined so that KadV =
δIC
δua
and Ja is such that JadV = δIC
δAa
. And since ua
and Aa are tensor fields, variations induced by the one parameter family of diffeomorphisms
generated by wa may be expressed as Lie derivatives.
There is one final step. The expression of a derivative operator in terms of the pair
(ua, Aa) is not unique. This means that there are some joint variations of u
a and Aa that do
not change∇0 (or t0a or hab0 ). With some algebra, one can show that these are variations of ua
and Aa such that t
0
aδu
a = 0, and which jointly satisfy the condition that δAa = hˆ
0
anδu
n+daζ,
where ζ is an arbitrary scalar field and hˆ0an is the unique tensor field such that (1) hˆ
0
abh
bc
0 =
δa
c − t0auc and (2) hˆ0abub = 0 (Duval and Ku¨nzle, 1978, p. 358). Observing that δ∇ must
vanish for variation of this sort, we find that:
0 =
∫
C
[
(Ka + hˆ
0
anJ
n)δua + Jadaζ)
]
dV. (14)
Since this must hold for arbitrary variations δua and for all smooth ζ, we conclude that
∇aJa = 0 and that Ka = −hˆ0anJa +Xta, where X is an (unspecified) constant.
Combining Eqs. (12) and (13) with this last expression for Ka in terms of J
a and X
allows us to finally conclude that
0 =
∫
C
(
Qat0n∇0awn − 2Pab∇0(awb) + Ja£wAa + (−hˆ0anJn +Xt0a)£wua
)
dV
=
∫
C
(
−∇0b T˜ ba + 2J bκab − hˆ0mnJn∇0aum
)
wadV, (15)
where we have, in the second equality, recalled that κab = daAb, integrated by parts, and
combined terms to define a field T˜ ab. Observing that if Eq. (15) is to hold for all vector fields
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wa with support C, and for all compact sets (with sufficiently small interior), we conclude
that the divergence of T˜ ab must be given by,
∇0aT˜ ab = 2Jaκba − hˆ0mnJn∇0aum (16)
The field Ja is naturally interpreted as a mass-current density. With this interpretation
in mind, we impose the following condition: we suppose that Ja is timelike and future-
directed when it is non-vanishing. This condition is precisely the mass condition used in
the classical analog to the Geroch-Jang theorem. (Note, however, that though the proposed
interpretation motivates this condition, the condition may be imposed without comment on
the interpretation of the fields.) This assumption allows us to write Ja at each point where
it is non-vanishing as Ja = ρηa, where ρ = Jata and η
a is a unit timelike vector. It also
allows us to define a symmetric tensor T ab as follows:
T ab = Jaηb + σab, (17)
where σab = −T˜ ab+Jaηb−Jaub is symmetric and spacelike in both indices. Using the known
divergences of Ja and T˜ ab, we conclude that that ∇0bT ab = 0. Thus, associated with generic
matter fields in GNG is a symmetric rank-2 tensor T ab that is divergence-free relative to ∇0.
The upshot of this discussion is substantially the same as in the relativistic theories
already discussed. Once again, it follows from the dynamics of matter in a classical spacetime
that, if those dynamics may be expressed via a Lagrangian density that depends only on the
fields describing the matter and the classical spacetime structures ta, h
ab, and ∇, then there
exists a symmetric rank-2 tensor field associated with the matter field that is divergence-
free relative to the covariant derivative operator associated with the classical spacetime.
The reason for this is just the same as before: it is this derivative operator, and compatible
metrics, that appear in the matter equations of motion. And so, if one accepts the conclusion
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of the last two sections, then it would seem that the status of the conservation condition in
Newtonian theories is very similar to in relativistic theories, including GR. In light of the
Newtonian analog to the Geroch-Jang theorem, then, it would seem that the status of inertial
motion in all of these theories is essentially the same. In all cases, the geodesic principle
arises as the small-body limiting behavior of generic matter satisfying field equations in
which the relevant geometric structures play a certain role, and no other such structures
appear.
This is not to say that no differences can be identified between the Newtonian and rela-
tivistic cases. There are some. For instance, in the Newtonian case, and not the relativistic
case, one requires a curvature condition, Rab
c
d = R
c
d
a
b, in order to derive the conservation
condition. If one drops this condition, one cannot conclude that κab is locally exact, and so
one cannot find a vector field Aa such that κab = daAb. Thus one cannot necessarily define
a vector field Ja with the properties derived above; instead, one should expect to derive an
antisymmetric rank-2 tensor. It is possible that one could make an argument like the one
above in this case as well, though it is not clear what the physical interest of doing so would
be, insofar as we are interested in “Newtonian” theories.
It is also interesting to note that an energy condition appears to be necessary in the
Newtonian case to arrive at the tensor T ab in the first place. This suggests that the mass
condition plays a deeper role in inertial motion in Newtonian theories than in GR (though of
course some energy condition is ultimately necessary in both theories). On the other hand,
the mass condition is not very strong, and at least in the derivation of T ab, its role is to
rule out only pathological cases in which matter is not associated with any mass at all.37
Note, too, that although the mass condition must hold, it still need not be the case that
Ja or T ab be interpreted as a mass-current density or mass-momentum density, respectively.
37That said, see Dewar and Weatherall (2017): insofar as gravitation is associated with a mass-momentum
tensor in Newtonian gravitation, it does not satisfy the mass condition.
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As long as there exist fields with the required positivity and conservation properties, the
geodesic principle theorem goes through. This last point leads to a final difference, which is
that we have many fewer worked examples of matter fields in GNG that are characterized
by an action principle.38 This situation has the consequence that there are fewer examples
in which we can observe that T ab as derived above is in fact the mass-momentum density
associated with some physical matter described by a Lagrangian density. But this worry
does not count against the conceptual point that one can generically derive some field T ab
in Newtonian theories just as in GR.
As a final observation, note that nothing in the above argument turns on the derivative
operator appearing in the classical spacetime be curved, nor that it arise via the geometrized
Poisson equation. In this sense, the argument applies equally well in ordinary Newtonian
gravitation as in GNG, just as the argument in section 3 applies equally well to SR. But note,
too, that the argument applies (only) to situations in which bodies are free in the sense that
no further fields appear in their Lagrangian densities, and thus in the ordinary Newtonian
case, only when gravitational effects are neglected (since otherwise, a gravitational field
would appear in the dynamics for matter). In other words, in the Newtonian case, in
the presence of gravitation, we should expect the mass-momentum of matter alone to have
non-vanishing divergence, reflecting the fact that bodies accelerate due to gravity.39 What is
interesting to observe, however, is that if one considered a joint Lagrangian density for matter
and the gravitational field, one would expect the argument to go through in such a way that
the total mass-momentum tensor, for both gravitation and matter, to be divergence-free.
38The main example, already cited above, is that of a Schro¨dinger field in a classical spacetime, as studied
by Duval and Ku¨nzle (1984) and Christian (1997). It would be interesting to develop a Lagrangian theory
of perfect fluids in the classical context.
39Again, see Dewar and Weatherall (2017).
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6. Geometry Revisited
The foregoing discussion might be summarized as follows. In a wide range of theories, in-
cluding GR but also GNG, unimodular gravity, TeVeS, and even SR and ordinary Newtonian
gravitation, inertial motion, in the form of a geodesic principle, may be understood as a the-
orem concerning the small-body limit of solutions to the equations governing matter. These
theorems require, as one of their assumptions, that associated with generic matter, there
is a symmetric rank-2 tensor T ab that is suitably positive and covariantly divergence-free
relative to some derivative operator; the theorems then ensure that sufficiently small bodies
(approximately) follow geodesics of this derivative operator. This means that establishing
that small bodies respect the inertial structure encoded by a given derivative operator ∇
requires one to establish that the T ab field associated with matter is divergence-free, or “con-
served”, with respect to ∇. This condition, in turn, holds generically, in both relativistic
and classical spacetimes, of any matter fields whose dynamics, in the absence of interactions
with other matter, may be described by a Lagrangian density that is an algebraic function
of just appropriate spacetime structures, the matter fields, and their covariant derivatives.
Thus, inertial motion follows under very general conditions from the role that a metric and
covariant derivative operator play in the differential equations governing that matter.40
40 The view just expressed is related to, but interestingly distinct from, the “spacetime functionalism”
defended by Knox (2013, 2017). On Knox’s view, spacetime is functional in the sense that “A structure that
plays the spacetime role in a theory just is spacetime; once one has analysed the role and understood what
fills it, there are no further questions to be asked about the ‘real’ spacetime structure. Spacetime is spacetime
by virtue of what it does, not what it is” (Knox, 2017, p. 9); she goes on to clarify that the “spacetime role is
played by whatever defines a structure of local inertial frames” (Knox, 2017, p. 10). I, meanwhile, argue that
inertial motion (which is not to say anything of inertial frames—a notion I find vexed and unhelpful in curved
spacetime) follows from the role that the metric and derivative operator play in the dynamics of matter.
In a sense, these views are complementary, then: Knox says that whatever determines inertial structure
must represent spacetime, and I show how the metric and covariant derivative operator determine inertial
structure. Still, I would remark on two important differences. The first is that I am not attempting to give
an account of what the “spacetime concept” is: on my view, there is no univocal “spacetime concept”, and
in particular, in addition to inertial structure, one might consider causal structure and structure concerning
lengths and duration to be essential to any proper understanding of spacetime, at least in some theories.
My goal instead is to investigate the link between a particular aspect of spatiotemporal structure and the
dynamics of matter. The second difference is that, on the view I am defending, the point is not merely
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As I have emphasized throughout, the argument just given does not depend on Einstein’s
equation or anything else special about GR. Although Einstein’s equation may also be used
to establish, in GR, that there is a quantity T ab that is covariantly divergence-free, Einstein’s
equation plays no role in the argument just given, which applies in a much broader range of
theories, including TeVeS, where it is the physical metric that determines inertial structure.
And so it seems misleading to emphasize Einstein’s equation in discussions of inertial motion
in GR. Ultimately Einstein’s equation is not necessary; nor is it sufficient, insofar as it does
not establish the energy condition, does not clearly bear on test matter, and cannot establish
the relationship between conservation and non-interaction. Studying the properties of the
actual dynamics of matter as a route to conservation, meanwhile, does establish conservation,
both for test matter and for non-interacting matter (even when other matter is present).
Although I do not discuss the energy conditions in detail in the present paper, it also seems
clear that the most promising route to establishing that an energy conditions holds is, once
again, to study the properties of energy-momentum tensors associated with matter, and not
via a study of Einstein’s equation.
On some level, this conclusion should be congenial to the defender of a “dynamical
perspective” on spatiotemporal structure such as Brown, who emphasizes the role of the
dynamics of matter in underwriting our claims about space and time, since after all, on
the view just described inertial motion follows from, and is explained by, the details of the
dynamics of matter. And indeed, it is hard to see how it could be otherwise.41 Insofar as the
coordinating principles that we use to give operational significance to the spacetime metric
that the metric and derivative operator determine inertial structure; rather, it is that they do so precisely
because of the role that they play in the matter dynamics. And, as I will argue below, one can naturally
construe that role as one of determining the physically salient notions of length and angle as respected by
evolving matter. In other words, the metric and covariant derivative operator play the functional role Knox
considers, but they do so by virtue of playing yet other roles in the theory—roles that are arguably just as
“spatiotemporal” as the one Knox emphasizes.
41Here I echo the perspective taken by Myrvold (2017) (albeit independently).
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in GR and other theories—principles like the geodesic principle, the clock hypothesis,42 and
so forth—concern the behavior of matter under idealized circumstances, it had better be
the case that the equations actually governing the dynamics of matter are compatible with
bodies actually doing what the interpretive principles say they must. From this perspective
it is also fair to say that, as Brown argues in Physical Relativity, spacetime structures such
as the metric may be viewed as “a codification of certain key aspects of the behaviour of
particles and fields” (p. 142), at least as regards the link between free, small-body motion
and the privileged class of curves picked out by a metric and/or derivative operator.43
And yet, despite this apparent congeniality, there are clear tensions between the conclu-
sions I reach here and Brown’s views on inertial motion. The obvious tension, of course,
concerns Brown’s claims that GR is starkly different from Newtonian theories and SR with
regards to inertial motion. It is hard to see on what grounds that distinction can be drawn—
especially if the difference is meant to come down to the status of the geodesic principle as
a theorem. One is left wondering if what really motivates Brown’s claims about inertia
is not that the geodesic principle is a theorem in GR, but that the metric and associated
derivative operator in GR are dynamical. This, at least, is what Sus (2014), in defending
Brown’s views, argues makes the explanation of inertia in GR “more dynamical” than in
other theories.44 (A similar suggestion is floated as a reading of Brown by Samaroo (2015),
who discusses the role of an “action-reaction” principle in Brown’s arguments.) But that
spacetime structures are dynamical does not distinguish GR from other theories, including
unimodular gravity, TeVeS, and even, to a lesser degree, GNG. And as we have seen, one can
see inertial motion as a theorem in these theories—but only if one justifies the conservation
condition via the dynamics of matter, in which case the arguments seem to go through in
42For a discussion of the clock hypothesis, see Fletcher (2013). As he shows there, one may view the clock
hypothesis as a theorem of GR, at least as regards periodic processes involving null curves (such as so-called
“light clocks”).
43See also Brown and Pooley (2006).
44Like Brown, Sus also emphasizes the role of Einstein’s equation in establishing conservation.
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just the same way in theories where spacetime structures are not dynamical. And so, that
the metric is dynamical in GR appears to be irrelevant to the status of inertial motion in
the theory.
A related tension is that, from the perspective developed here, it is hard to see anything
distinctively “conspiratorial” about inertial motion in SR or Newtonian gravitation. In
these theories, just as in GR and TeVeS, inertial motion is a special case of the dynamics of
matter, applicable in the small body limit (and more generally, at least in flat spacetime)
and in the absence of interactions. If inertial motion is conspiratorial, then surely all motion
is conspiratorial. After all, how are different bodies of a given sort—or fields in different
regions—to all know to satisfy the same differential equations? I do not mean to claim that
this question is not interesting or legitimate or even philosophically rich. But it begins to
look less like a question about inertia in particular, and more like an expression of Humean
skepticism (or at least puzzlement) concerning the metaphysical status of laws of nature
more generally. And if this is what is ultimately at issue, then it is hard to see how GR
could be said to provide any help at all. If our goal is to explain how matter in different
regions of space and time can somehow all satisfy the same laws of nature, then merely
positing yet more laws of nature cannot be to the point.
Still, there is a deeper issue here. The situation is not just that the laws governing the
matter we observe in the universe happen to have geodesic motion as a special, limiting case.
The arguments presented here show much more than that. They show that any equations
governing matter that can be derived from a Lagrangian of a certain sort, with certain
dependencies on a metric and its associated derivative operator (or, in the classical case, the
classical metrics and derivative operator), will have the same small body, non-interacting
behavior. In other words, the reason that a metric (or metrics) and derivative operator are
able to codify the behavior of (generic) matter in the way characterized by the geodesic
principle is precisely that that metric and derivative operator are the ones that appear in
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the dynamics of (all) matter in the relevant ways. And this, I think, is ultimately what is
at the heart of the matter.
As I see it, the most perspicuous explication of what one means, or at least what one
should mean, by the claim that spacetime has some geometry, represented by a given metric
(or metrics) and derivative operator, is precisely that one can express the dynamics of
(all) matter in such a way that all inner products are taken relative to that metric and all
derivatives are taken relative to that derivative operator. This is the physical content of the
claim that there are facts about distances, angles, and duration: physical processes occur in
such a way that changes in a quantity at a time depend on the state of that quantity and
those facts about distances, angles, and duration. And so, one is left with the conclusion
that spacetime structures codify certain facts about the behavior of matter because the
dynamics of (all) matter is adapted to those spacetime structures, which is just another way
of saying that spacetime “has” that geometry.
In fact, Brown makes what I take to be a related point, though he expresses it differently.
In his terms, it is the “strong equivalence principle” that allows us to give “chronometric
significance” to the metric gab. He initially describes this principle in terms of the existence
of certain coordinate systems, but then goes on to say that the strong equivalence principle
as he understands it contains two principles that he attributes to Anderson (1967). These
principles are (1) “that measurements on any physical system will serve (approximately) to
determine the same [covariant derivative operator] in a given region of spacetime”; and (2)
“only the [derivative operator] determined by [gab], with its Lorentzian signature, appear in
the dynamical laws for these systems” (p. 170). This way of characterizing things emphasizes
the derivative operator over the metric, when in fact both generally appear in the dynamical
laws. But I think the moral is substantially the same: it is because a particular derivative
operator (and metric) appear in a particular way in the equations of motion governing matter
that we can ultimately interpret those fields geometrically.
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Whether one describes this situation by invoking a principle, or else by saying that
spacetime has a given geometry (in the sense described above) strikes me as immaterial.
But Brown places great weight on the further claim that attributing a given geometry to
spacetime does no work—or at least, that it plays no explanatory role. For instance, he
rejects the view that he attributes to Friedman (1983), Balashov and Janssen (2003), and
others that it is the fact that, in SR, spacetime is Minkowskian that explains why Maxwell’s
equations and other field dynamics are Lorentz invariant (Brown, 2005, pp. 132-143). Later,
he writes:
It is true that in both GR and TeVeS all matter fields couple in the same way
to a single ‘metric’ field of Lorentzian signature, which ensures local Lorentz
covariance; and by coupling minimally, special relativity in its full glory appears
to be valid locally. But to say that these metric fields are space-time itself, or
properties of space-time, is simply to re-express this remarkable double claim,
not to account for it. (p. 176)
It is this last claim that seems too strong. Even if asserting that the metric in GR, or the
physical metric in TeVeS, represents spacetime geometry is merely to re-express the claim
that it is this metric and its associated derivative operator that play the particular roles they
do in the dynamics of matter, it nonetheless seems that making this observation—however
expressed—carries significant explanatory weight. It tells us that it is the lengths, angles,
and so on described by this particular metric that are the physically salient ones, the ones
that enter into the dynamics of matter. That spacetime has this geometry—i.e., that it is
this geometry to which matter dynamics are adapted—is what explains why matter moves
as it does.
One can come at this same conclusion from another direction. In order to express a
system of differential equations on a manifold, some background geometrical structure needs
to be presupposed.45 For instance, if one wants to take derivatives, one needs to work in a
45This is a moral that I take from Stein (1967), who argued in particular that at the heart of the dispute
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space on which a derivative operator is defined. If one wants to take inner products, or relate
vectorial quantities with their duals, one needs a metric. And so on. All of the equations
governing matter in the history of physics presuppose some structure of this sort.
One can try to identify this structure in multiple ways, of course. For instance, one can
work with coordinate free methods and (attempt to) define, in a coordinate-independent
manner, the structures that your equations will presuppose and then write the equations
referring only to those structures. Or one could choose some coordinate system—itself a
kind of background structure above and beyond the manifold structure—and express your
equations using the coordinate derivative operator and some metric expressed in coordi-
nates. In this latter case, one can then ask how the same equations might be expressed in
different coordinate systems, and discover some transformation rules that will generally pick
out “preferred” coordinates—i.e., coordinates that are suitably adapted to the geometrical
structures to which your equations are adapted.46 These may be thought of as “bottom
up” and “top down” approaches to identifying spacetime structure, respectively. Perhaps
there are other approaches. But the end result is the same: one arrives at some system of
equations, along with an understanding of the background geometry built into those equa-
between Leibniz and Newton (or really, Clark) was a disagreement about how much background structure
was needed to express adequate laws of motion. Newton believed he needed the structure of what we now
call Newtonian spacetime; Leibniz insisted that any (metaphysically?) adequately theory would make use
of strictly less. But as Weyl (1922) first showed, Newton’s laws do not need the full structure of Newtonian
spacetime—instead, they need only Galilean spacetime, i.e., a 4-dimensional affine space, with classical
metrics. One can run a similar argument with Maxwell’s equations: the standard of rest provided by an
aether in Galilean spacetime effectively provides the structure of Newtonian spacetime; one can understand
Lorentz, Einstein, and Minkowski to have each made important steps to the recognition that one can get
away with merely Minkowski spacetime, which, like Galilean spacetime, has less structure than Newtonian
spacetime (but whose structure is neither less nor more than Galilean spacetime) (Barrett, 2015; Weatherall,
2016d,c). The important point in all of this is that laws of motion, including field equations such as Maxwell’s
equations, only make sense if one has already postulated some geometrical context. That said, I do not mean
to suggest it is (always) clear precisely what structure must be postulated, as is evidenced by the recent
(and not so recent) discussions of the spacetime structure needed for Newton’s theory, in light of Corollary
VI to the laws of motion (Stein, 1977; DiSalle, 2008; Saunders, 1989; Knox, 2014; Weatherall, 2016b; Dewar,
2017; Wallace, 2016a; Dewar, 2017; Teh, 2017; Weatherall, 2017a).
46The connection between coordinate systems, transformation rules, and geometrical structure is explored
in more detail by Wallace (2016b).
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tions. If the equations are meant to describe the evolution of matter in space and time,
it is natural to describe the geometrical structures to which those equations are adapted
“spacetime geometry”.
Starting in this way makes it look as if spacetime geometry is somehow conceptually
prior to dynamics, in just the sense that Brown objects to so strenuously. And there is a
real worry here: having asserted that spacetime has some geometry, one is certainly entitled
to ask what the physical interpretation of that geometry is supposed to be. One can give
several answers. If the geometry in question is Lorentzian, then one can describe how the
metric characterizes relations of causal connectibility between events in space and time or
the behavior of periodic processes that we might think of as idealized clocks, or how the
derivative operator determines the trajectories of small bodies. But one might be dissatisfied
with this sort of answer: after all, you have gone to the trouble to define some dynamics
for matter, and whether matter actually behaves the way these interpretive principles claim
will surely depend on the details of those dynamics. And it does so depend. But at least in
the case of geodesic motion, the interpretive principle is vindicated. More, as I have shown
in the foregoing, it is vindicated precisely because the dynamics in question presuppose just
the geometrical structures whose significance we go on to explicate by means of the motion
of small bodies.
My purpose in retelling the story in this way is not to defend the opposite view, that
somehow it is only geometry that plays any explanatory role—or even that geometry is prior
to dynamics. Rather, it is to emphasize the ways in which geometry and dynamics constrain
and support one another.47 To posit a given geometry for spacetime is to limit the resources
available for expressing dynamical laws; whether a given geometry is suitable for expressing
the actual laws is a highly contingent matter. Meanwhile, given a system of differential equa-
47It is this basic view, that the foundations of a physical theory should be understood as a network
of mutually supporting and constraining principles, that I have elsewhere called the “puzzleball view”
(Weatherall, 2017b).
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tions, one can extract information about physical geometry by studying things about, for
instance, causal cones and propagation speeds, the motion o non-interacting, small bodies,
and even the symmetry properties of the equations. It is this geometrical information that
ultimately should be interpreted as physical geometry. And so, geometry constrains dynam-
ics, but so too do dynamics constrain geometry. The inferences—and the explanations—go
in both directions.
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